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ABSTRACT.  By  portraying  meaning  as  a  phenomenon  that  eludes
complete  expression  and  arises  spontaneously  in  our  everyday
embodied interactions with others and objects in the world, as well as
in our own unconscious registering of those interactions, Woolf’s Mrs.
Dalloway is  uniquely  insightful  concerning  both  the  presence  of
meaning  in  modern  life  and  the  modern  conception  of  the  self  –
phenomena  marked  by  a  certain  ineradicable  tension  between  that
which is constituted by us and that which is given from outside us.
This paper examines this tension through the lens of Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology,  with  special  attention  to  the  leitmotif  of  the
«spontaneity  of  sense».  Woolf  and  Merleau-Ponty  both  help  to
illustrate  an  important  modern  insight:  that  among  the  most
meaningful experiences are those that are not only unexpected and
unexplained,  but  in  some  sense  foreign  and  unexplainable  –
mysterious  events  and  yet  everyday  occurrences  that  explode  the
supposed  privacy  of  our  thoughts,  and  exceed  our  capacity  for
expression.
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The final scene of Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway takes place at a party,
the major event at the culmination of the otherwise rather ordinary
June  day  in  which  the  entirety  of  the  novel  occurs.  At  her  party,
Clarissa  Dalloway learns  of  the  suicide  of  a  war veteran,  Septimus
Smith, unknown to her in the novel, though known to the reader, and
steps away into a separate room, where the news prompts an internal
monologue  –  a  depiction  of  inner  life  in  which  identity,  social
expectation and history interweave to create meaning in the fragile
fabric of semi-self-transparency characteristic of the modern self:
They went on living (she would have to go back; the rooms
were still crowded; people kept on coming). They (all day she
had been thinking of Bourton, of Peter, of Sally), they would
grow old. A thing there was that mattered; a thing, wreathed
about with chatter, defaced, obscured in her own life, let drop
everyday in corruption,  lies,  chatter.  This he had preserved.
Death was defiance. Death was an attempt to communicate;
people feeling the impossibility of reaching the centre which,
mystically, evaded them […].1
At the apex of the novel, in a room alone, Clarissa remembers the lost
days  of  her  youth  at  a  country  estate,  Bourton,  and  mourns  the
trappings of social class and «chatter» of modern life, mechanisms that
both made it impossible to reach the center, the mattering of things,
and that made it possible to cope with modern life in spite of such a
lack. She finds the ultimate triumph over the scattering of modern life
in the death of someone she has never met, whose intersection with
her own life (a central motif in the novel) is the result of nothing more
than chance and circumstance. 
What arises at the end of the novel, amidst the special atmosphere of
Clarissa’s  party,  is  that what matters most is  tied to that which we
often think matters least; the meanings that make life meaningful are
those that seem, from the outside, the most common, pedestrian, and
1 WOOLF 1990 [1925], 184, my emphasis.
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everyday. And the self for whom those meanings matter – for a central
character who we learn, at the beginning of the novel, «would not say
of herself, I am this, I am that» – is revealed to exist only in a tension,
somewhere between self-conception and a history and identity drawn
from others and the world, a tension in which, Clarissa recognizes,
Septimus too must have lived and died. «Did it matter then, she asked
herself,  walking  towards  Bond  Street,  did  it matter  that  she  must
inevitably cease completely; all this must go on without her; did she
resent it; or did it not become consoling to believe that death ended
absolutely? but that somehow in the streets of London, on the ebb and
flow of things, here, there, she survived».2
The lyrical, expressive language of high modernism employed in the
novel  should  not  be  confused  for  a  mismatch  with  the  seemingly
pedestrian themes portrayed. The stakes in the novel are indeed high:
spurred  by  the  psychological  complexities  of  a  post-  war  society
unable to fully come to terms with the history and crisis it has just
lived, and without the vocabulary to process or fully acknowledge the
trauma that has occurred, Clarissa reflects at the outset of the narrative
that «the late age of the world’s experience had bred in them all, men
and women, a well of tears».3 As David Trotter notes, Mrs. Dalloway is
characteristic of modernist novels of the interwar period in its turn to
more experimental forms of writing due to a dissatisfaction with the
received meanings of the age: «In a time of crisis, the fabric of meaning
wears thin in places, and meaninglessness sows through: the stories
we tell  about experience,  the  symbols  which offer  themselves  from
within  it,  no  longer  suffice».4 And  yet  the  «mattering»  Clarissa
experiences  in  the  passage  is  portrayed  as  a  sort  of  common  if
underlying and not-often-discussed feature of  our everyday lives,  a
sort of meaningfulness that arises in the «ebb and flow of things», in
the interstices of modern life. As Mark Hussey puts it, Woolf’s work
evinces  a  certain  «tension»,  «a  world characterized by a  lack,  by  a
2 WOOLF 1990 [1925], 8-9.
3 WOOLF 1990 [1925], 9.
4 TROTTER 1999, 77.
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sense of an abstract ‘gap’ in being that cannot be directly referred to in
language, but which is certainly a potential of human experience».5 
This  paper  seeks  to  examine  this  gap,  this  tension,  with  special
attention  to  the  phenomenon  of  meaning  and  its  relationship  to
expression,  to  the  nature  of  our  lived  experience  of  a  meaningful
world, and to the modern complications of identity and selfhood that
arise therefrom. The observation at the heart of my claims can be put
thus: We often recognize things as mattering to us before we have a clear and
distinct  conception  of  what  exactly  it  is  that  matters,  or  even  why.  The
complexities of human experience somehow make that experience meaningful,
in ways that we always fall somewhere short of fully expressing or explaining,
even to ourselves. Woolf’s novel helps to show us that among the most
meaningful  experiences  in  our  lives  are  those  that  are  not  only
unexpected  and  unexplained,  but  in  some  sense  foreign  and
unexplainable – mysterious events and yet everyday occurrences that
explode the supposed privacy of our thoughts and that seem to exceed
our capacity for expression. Rather than taking this phenomenon to lie
somewhere at the periphery of human experience, I claim instead that
it stands near its core, at the intersection of experience and meaning.
By  examining  Mrs.  Dalloway through  a  phenomenological  lens,
primarily using the work of Merleau-Ponty and following the leitmotif
of the «spontaneity of sense», I consider a set of related insights about
meaning  and  the  self  important  to  the  development  of  the
phenomenological tradition and reflected, I argue, in Woolf’s text. By
portraying meaning as a phenomenon that eludes complete expression
and arises spontaneously in our everyday embodied interactions with
others and objects in the world, as well as in our own unconscious
registering of those interactions,  Mrs. Dalloway  is uniquely insightful
concerning  both  the  presence  of  meaning  in  modern  life  and  the
modern conception of the self – both phenomena marked by a certain
ineradicable tension between that which is produced or constituted by
us and that which is given from outside us.
Since Mrs. Dalloway was published in 1925, well before some of the
5 HUSSEY 1986, xx.
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developments of mid-twentieth-century phenomenology discussed in
this essay, my claim is not that phenomenological work on these topics
directly influenced Woolf in writing the book, nor that this novel in
particular influenced later phenomenological thinkers,6 but rather that
they exhibit important insights about meaning and the mattering of
experience that are mutually illuminating, and that seem to have been
particularly  prevalent  in  period  shared  by  literary  modernism  and
phenomenology. Section One introduces the problematic of expression
and  the  notion  of  spontaneous  sense  in  Merleau-Ponty  through  a
genealogy of the phenomenological concepts of meaning, motivation,
and embodiment, with reference to examples in Woolf’s text. Section
Two focuses on the ways in which perspectivalism situates meaning
outside the subject in world of shared experiences and things. Section
Three  focuses  on  the  ways  in  which  this  situated  meaning  is
manifested  passively  in  the  subject  herself,  below  the  threshold  of
conscious  awareness  and  expression.  Section  Four  uses  Merleau-
Ponty’s conception of institution to show how, despite the historical
“sedimentation” of meaning, the spontaneity of sense marks a certain
spontaneity  and  unpredictability  in  modern  life  that  Woolf
intentionally  integrates  into  her  experimental  prose  style.  Finally,
Section Five applies these insights concerning meaning to the modern
problematic of self and identity, as evidenced in Woolf’s portrayal of
Clarissa Dalloway herself.
1.  Meaning,  Embodied Experience,  and the Limits of
Expression: From Husserl to Merleau-Ponty
In The Prose of the World, Merleau-Ponty asserts that to express oneself
is «to create a path between my life and the lives of others» in the
6 Though  it  is  certainly  no  stretch  to  say  that  modernist  literature  in  general  affected
subsequent  phenomenologists,  as  is  clear,  e.g.,  in  the  case  of  Merleau-Ponty’s  (1973
[1969]) Prose of the World. For an extended phenomenological treatment of themes in Mrs.
Dalloway outside my scope here, see RICŒUR 1990 [1983-5], Vol. II, 101-12.
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course of lived experience, where «lines between one life and another
are  not  traced in  advance».7 This  serves  as  an apt  description of  a
central motif in Woolf’s novel: the mirroring of the lives of Clarissa
and Septimus. While they never directly meet in the novel, we learn in
the final pages that Clarissa «felt somehow very like him», and Woolf
links  the  two  characters  by  means  of  parallel  thoughts  and
experiences,  similar  reactions  to  the  confrontations  of  the  modern
world, and common references to a romanticized past in the works of
Shakespeare. These connections, especially those via intertextuality –
the appeal within one medium of expression (a novel) to another (a
Shakespearean play) – illustrate the complex role expression plays in
mediating relationships and identities. As Merleau-Ponty notes, it is in
large part through cultural products of expression such as literature
and painting that
I come to abide in lives that are not mine. I confront them, I
reveal them to one another, I make them share equally in an
order  of  truth.  Responsible  for  all  of  them,  I  awaken  a
universal life – just as in one fell swoop I assume my place in
space through the live and dense presence of my body. Like
the operation of my body, the function of words or paintings
remains obscure to me. The words, the lines, and the colors
which express me come from me as my gestures and are torn
from me by what I want to do. In this sense, there is in all
expression – even in linguistic expression – a spontaneity that
will not tolerate commands, even those I would like to give to
myself. In the art of prose, words carry the speaker and the
listener  into a  common universe  by drawing both toward a
new signification through their power to designate in excess of
their  accepted  definition  or  the  usual  signification  that  is
deposited in them from the life they have had together in us.8 
The passage’s appeal to the complex relationship between experience,
7 MERLEAU-PONTY 1973 [1969], 86-7.
8 MERLEAU-PONTY 1973 [1969], 86-7.
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the  self,  expression,  and  language  points  to  an  important  set  of
insights into meaning developed in the phenomenological tradition.
These insights can help us to explain the great enigma of the mirroring
of  the  lives  of  Septimus  and  Clarissa  in  the  novel,  and  the  great
mystery  of  «mattering»  that  so  preoccupies  Clarissa  in  the  book’s
closing  scene.  At  the  core  of  these  ideas  in  Merleau-Ponty  are  the
phenomenological  concepts  of  motivation,  the  spontaneity  of  meaning,
the  lived  body  as  a  source  of  meaning,  and  the  tension  between  the
spontaneity of sense and meaning as expression. It will be useful to begin
by  sketching  the  historical  background  of  these  closely  connected
notions.
The  phenomenological  theory  of  meaning  as  first  developed  by
Husserl was an attempt to address a fundamental enigma that lies at
the  very  heart  of  meaningful  experience:  the  process  by  which
experience  is  given  its  sense,  the  process  which  Husserl’s
contemporary,  the logician Gottlobb Frege once called «perhaps the
most  mysterious  of  all».9 In  his  earlier  phenomenology,  Husserl
insisted that all meaning can, at least in principle, be traced back to
intentionally  directed  synthesizing  acts  of  a  «constituting»
consciousness  or  transcendental  ego  (a  term  Husserl  adopts  –  in
modified form – in the sense of Descartes’  ego cogito ergo sum10):  the
constitution of meaning is always a Sinngebung, an accomplishment of
my  consciousness  arising  from  my  lived  experience  of  the  world
toward  which  my  consciousness  is  directed.  Meaning  is  a
phenomenon encountered in that lived experience but revelatory of a
priori  essences  or  ideal  meanings  –  including  but  not  limited  to
linguistic or expressed meanings [Bedeutungen].11 And while meaning
is  not  simply equivalent  to  expression,  all  meaning is,  in  principle,
express-able.12
In  his  mature  phenomenology,  as  Husserl  became  increasingly
9 Frege, qtd. in MOHANTY 1976, 37.
10 See HUSSERL 1960 [1931], Meditation One.
11 Husserl’s Sinn/Bedeutung distinction differs from Frege’s in important ways. For a brief
discussion and references, see RUMP 2018.
12 HUSSERL 2014 [1913], 259ff.
Metodo Vol. 6, n. 1 (2018)
324                                                                                                   Jacob Rump
interested  in  “genetic”  questions  concerning  not  just  the  “static”
phenomena  of  meaning  in  everyday  experience  but  also  how  such
meanings  first  arise  historically  and  in  social  and  intersubjective
context,  the  transparency  for  consciousness  of  the  meanings
constituted  for  it  began  to  be  questioned,  and  the  account  of  the
“active”  synthesis  of  meaning  was  supplemented  by an account  of
“passive” synthesis.13 Alongside this, Husserl began to think that his
descriptive phenomenological account needed to more fully separate a
broader  notion  of  meaning  as  sense  (Sinn)  from  its  exclusive
«interweaving» with expressed meaning (Bedeutung):
[I]t is almost unavoidable and at the same time an important
step in knowledge to expand and suitably modify the meaning
of these words, through which it finds application in a certain
way […] to all acts, regardless of whether they are interwoven
or  not  with  acts  of  expressing.  So,  too,  for  all  intentional
experiences, we always spoke of “sense” [Sinn] – a word that is
generally used in a way equivalent to «meaning». For the sake
of clarity, however, we prefer the word meaning [Bedeutung]
for  the  old  concept  and,  in  particular  […]  meaning  that
“expresses” something. We use the word sense [Sinn] as before
with the more encompassing scope in mind.14
In  his  later  work,  Husserl  argued  that  when  we  examine  the
meaningfulness of our experience from genetic, social and historical
perspectives,  we  come  to  see  that  it  does  not  simply  arise  from  a
previously indeterminate perceptual  mass:  the objects  of  experience
13 By the «mature» Husserl I mean the explicitly «transcendental» position he developed in
works  beginning  with  HUSSERL 2014 [1913].  Although  this  theory  shares  important
similarities  with  Husserl’s  earlier  theory  of  meaning  as  developed  in  HUSSERL 2001
[1900/01], it  is  the later transcendental version of his views that has had the greater
influence on the development of subsequent work on meaning in Merleau-Ponty. The
exact dating of Husserl’s transcendental turn and its relationship to his genetic turn and
to the development of the account of passive synthesis are a matter of some scholarly
dispute, but a position on these questions is not necessary for my argument here. 
14 HUSSERL 2014 [1913], 245.
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appear in the context of a history of previous, largely intersubjectively
constituted  meaning,  organized  in  a  nexus  of  «motivational»
structures  or  implications  which  tend  to  direct  our  intentional
awareness toward some aspects of the perceptual field and not others. 
Even  before  Husserl’s  Sinn/Bedeutung distinction,  the  notion  of
motivation already features in Husserl’s  early work,  in the guise of
indication, which he contrasts with expression. Whereas expressions are
meaningful signs on the model of «verbal signs» or speech (whether or
not they are actually uttered by a speaker)15, indications may function
even  in  cases  where  there  is  nothing  explicitly  «standing  for»
something  else.  In  this  «live  functioning»  of  indication  relations,
«certain objects or states of affairs  of whose reality someone has actual
knowledge indicate to him  the reality of certain other objects or states of
affairs, in the sense that his  belief in the reality of the one is experienced
(though not at all evidently) as motivating a belief or surmise in the reality
of another».16 In Husserl’s later work, with the turn to passive as well as
active levels of intentional experience, the active connotations of the
«actual  knowledge»  requisite  for  indication  are  revised,  and  the
motivational  directing of  intentional  experience occurs  not  only  via
objects  and  states  of  affairs  of  explicit,  linguistically  mediated
perceptions,  but  also  via  affective  and  kinaesthetic  experiences
undergone by the lived body. And with Husserl’s distinction between
Sinn and  Bedeutung  in this later work, such experiences, even in the
absence of direct conscious awareness, conceptual schematization, or
linguistic expression, are taken to be in their own way, meaningful.17 To
15 HUSSERL 2001 [1900-01], Investigation I, §5. This is, of course, the claim that Derrida seizes
upon in his Voice and Phenomena. For discussion of Derrida’s critique issue in relation to
the lived body and Husserl’s Sinn/Bedeutung distinction, see RUMP 2018.
16 HUSSERL 2001 [1900-01], Investigation I, §2.
17 For a more detailed interpretation of Husserl’s later work along these lines, see Rump
2017. With regard to contemporary debates in epistemology and the philosophy of mind,
one of the most important issues raised by Husserl’s views concerning passive structures
such as those of affectivity is the degree to which they can be understood to fit within
the framework of conceptualism and representationalism in the theory of perception. My
own view (which cannot be defended here, but which follows from the claims above
about  a non-linguistic  level  of meaning  qua  sense in Husserl’s  mature works)  is  that
Husserl’s position should be understood to be non-conceptualist but not necessarily non-
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say that one experience motivates another is not to say that it causes it,
nor that the first instigates an explicit reasoning in which we somehow
infer the second, but only that our intentional directedness shifts from
one to the other in that the second is somehow felt to follow from and
meaningfully belong with the first.
We  can  illustrate  these  ideas  with  an  example  from  Woolf  in  a
passage involving the first of several shifts in narrative perspective in
the novel, in which we transition via intermediary characters from the
thoughts of Clarissa to those of Septimus: if, like Clarissa, while in a
flower shop, I hear a sound like a pistol shot, I will tend to go to the
window, turning my attention to the street  outside from which the
sound  seems  to  have  come,  and  I  will  automatically  seek  out
perceptual  objects  through which to  make sense of  the sound. I  will
cease paying attention to what is now merely background, and for all
intents and purposes, “non-sense,” (e.g., the color and scents of flower
arrangements, or the innocent passers-by on the street), and will look
instead for something like a pistol or, as it may turn out, for a motor
car that has backfired. Despite others nearby being involved in their
own  quite  different  thoughts,  projects,  and  preoccupations  of  the
moment, if they are within earshot, there is no rational choice here;
they cannot help but each experience a similar intentional shift: «Every
one looked at the motor car. Septimus looked. Boys on bicycles sprang
off. Traffic accumulated».18 
But if this common shift in attention is not a matter of rational choice
for those who experience  it,  nor is  it  a  strictly  causal phenomenon.
Whereas the sound of the shot might  cause an immediate embodied
reaction in the form of a startle response, and while, upon reflection, I
might reason that the sound is more likely to have come from a car
backfiring than from  a pistol,  the  immediate  shift  in  attention and
representational, given a suitably broad notion of «representation». If this is right, it is
actually possible to account for the insights into «spontaneous sense» discussed in this
paper on more orthodox Husserlian grounds, and without the need for the revisions to
Husserl’s account proffered by later phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty. I do not,
however, pursue that line of thought here.
18 WOOLF 1990 [1925], 15.
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meaning in the midst of which I already find myself homing in on the
source of  the disturbance –  prior to  or  independent  of  any explicit
reasoning –  is,  in  phenomenological  terms,  motivational.  While  we
might be tempted, in an everyday sense, to explain such situations in
terms of causes, we are then no longer using the concept of causation
in any strict, mechanistic, scientific, third-personal sense. When Woolf
explains,  from  the  standpoint  of  Septimus,  that  «the  sun  became
extraordinarily  hot  because  the  motor  car  had  stopped»,  the  car
certainly did not physically cause a change in the temperature of the
sunlit air. But, in this sense, nor did Septimus’ perception of the car
cause  the  shift  in  his  attention  or  cause him to  perceive  the  sun  as
hotter. Nor was this the result of reasoning. The shift in attention is
motivational – a shift of sense.
Furthermore, as the example of Septimus shows, motivation in this
technical, phenomenological sense is in each case deeply personal and
tied  to  one’s  own  thoughts,  circumstances  and  roles.  Whereas  for
Septimus, particularly susceptible to sudden loud noises as a result of
his PTSD, «the world wavered and quivered and threatened to burst
into  flames»,  Miss  Pym,  the  florist  helping  Clarissa  to  choose  the
flowers for her party, returns from the window «smiling apologetically
with her hands full of sweet peas, as if those motor cars, those tyres of
motor cars, were all her fault».19 
Woolf’s  description  of  the  reactions  of  different  characters  to  the
motor car (which mirrors the depiction of reactions to the cloudwriter,
discussed  below)  thus  displays  at  once  a  common  structure  of
motivated  attentional  attunement  and  the  unique  and  personal
nexuses  of  meaning  in  which  the  motivated  shifts  in  thought  are
situated. This reflects an important tension20 between the constitution
and  the  givenness  or  spontaneity  of  sense:  while  meaning  is
something that each of us – in some sense, though not always actively
– makes, we cannot simply «construct» meaning in the world any way
19 WOOLF 1990 [1925], 13-4.
20 See the discussion of the «inner tension» between sense-constitution and sense-donation
in the editors’ introduction to GONDEK, KLASS, & TENGELYI 2011, 11.
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that  we  want:  meaning-making  is  a  motivated  intentional
phenomenon  that  is  in  some  sense  shared,  and  while  necessarily
related  to  consciousness  in  what  Husserl  calls  a  structure  of
«correlation», it is also beyond or outside it.21
One of the most important strands of post-Husserlian thinking about
these issues concerning meaning is found in the phenomenology of
Merleau-Ponty.22 Merleau-Ponty  follows  Husserl  in  emphasizing  the
phenomenological significance of motivation as a form of meaningful
relation not  assimilable  to  causality  or  to  reason,  and he  uses  this
notion  extensively  to  develop  his  account  of  «operative
intentionality».23 In the Phenomenology of Perception, he addresses these
themes  by  examining  structural  features  of  the  lived  body,
emphasizing the sense – present in Husserl’s thought but not readily
apparent  in  his  texts  publicly  available  at  the  time  –  in  which the
constitution of meaning occurs not only via linguistic expression but
also  via  embodied  sense,  at  a  level  of  «passivity»  below  active,
thematic conscious awareness. This focus on the direct role of the lived
body  in  meaning  constitution  calls  into  question  the  constitutive
priority  of  a  conscious,  self-reflective  ego:  «it  is  certainly  true  that
there  are no obstacles  in themselves,  but  the ‘myself’  that  qualifies
them as obstacles  is  not  an acosmic  subject;  this  subject  anticipates
himself among the things in order to give them the shape of things.
There is an autochthonous sense of the world that is constituted in the
exchange  between the  world and our  embodied  existence  and that
forms  the  ground  of  every  deliberate  Sinngebung».24 Merleau-Ponty
21 HUSSERL 2014  [1913],  §116. On the  notion  of  constitution  vs.  construction,  see  COBB-
STEVENS 1974, 119ff.
22 This is not to say that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of meaning is the only
such account post-Husserl: there are similarities to the Merleau-Pontyian notion of the
spontaneity of sense to be found, e.g., in Heidegger’s account of  Ereignis.  Along with
ideas  of  Merleau-Ponty  of  the  sort  discussed  here,  this  notion  is  central  for  the
development  of  the  account  spontaneous  sense as  «meaning events»  in  more recent
French phenomenology – a closely related topic but beyond my scope here (see TENGELYI
2010 for an overview). 
23 For an overview of the notion of motivation in Merleau-Ponty, see WRATHALL 2005.
24 MERLEAU-PONTY 2013 [1945], 466.
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rethinks the subject as an embodied site of interaction with the world,
insisting upon our situatedness in concrete lived experiences, «among
things»  that  affect  consciousness  and  thereby  help  to  motivate
meaning from without. The center of experience is thus no longer the
transcendental  consciousness  of  Husserl’s  project  (or  even  the  self-
reflective  hermeneutics  of  Heidegger’s  Dasein);  it  is  instead  an
embodied being in  the  world that  can «give  shape to  things»  only
because it exists as a thing among them. Embodied aspects of lived
experience outside the conscious, representational, constituting system
of  sense-perception  help  to  present  the  meaningful  world  to  us  as
something to some degree simply «given»,  already there for  me in a
nexus of motivational relations.
While the terminological trappings of phenomenology present all of
this in a technical register, they are attempting to describe elements of
a fairly regular occurrence in lived experience: often our bodies react
to things before our minds “come to terms” with them and recognize
their  meaningfulness  explicitly.  Take another  example  from Woolf’s
novel, in which, at her party, amidst the multifarious distractions of
greeting  guests  and  making  small  talk,  Clarissa  first  hears  of  the
suicide of Septimus: 
He  had  killed  himself  –  but  how?  Always  her  body  went
through it first, when she was told, suddenly, of an accident;
her  dress  flamed,  her  body  burnt.  He  had  thrown  himself
from  a  window.  Up had flashed  the  ground;  through him,
blundering, bruising, went the rusty spikes. There he lay with
a  thud,  thud,  thud  in  his  brain,  and  then  a  suffocation  of
blackness. So she saw it. But why had he done it?25 
Clarissa  undergoes  an  empathic  reaction  to  the  news  of  Septimus’
death and how it occurred, but she does so in the first instance not via
conscious reflection on the  news,  but  «suddenly»,  by means of  the
reaction of her body. We see here another example of motivation, as in
25 WOOLF 1990 [1925], 184.
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the case of the car backfiring, but here the motivation is tied even more
explicitly  to  the  lived  body:  first  the  news  motivates  an  embodied
response – it is her body which first “makes sense” of the event – and
only  then  does  she  «see  it»  with  the  mind’s  eye  and  attempt,
reflectively and cognitively, to come to terms with and give expression
to what has occurred. And we relate to this depiction not in the first
instance through an intersubjectively shared language, but due to the
recognition of a similar operative intentionality at work in our own
bodies that constitutes its own level of intersubjectivity.
In later work, Merleau-Ponty would further expand these insights
concerning  our  immediate  embodied  lived  experience  into  his
conception  of  «the  flesh»  and  the  related  notion  of  «wild  sense»,
structures of experience which he saw as closely intertwined with –
but  always  finally  separate  from  and  never  simply  reducible  to  –
expression.26 On Laszlo Tengelyi’s interpretation, for Merleau-Ponty, 
Although the wild sense  of an experience  can,  in  principle,
always be transmuted by a sufficiently creative expression into
a freshly instituted meaning, the inevitably ensuing process of
conceptual sedimentation never fails to regenerate the tension
which has thus been eliminated. It may be inferred from this
observation that not just a harmless difference but rather an
irremediable –  because  inappropriable –  alterity  keeps  distinct
experience and expression from each other. We may claim that
it is the experience of this alterity which gives rise to the very
notion of reality.27
I  have argued in  this  section that  the  recognition of  this  structural
tension led Merleau-Ponty –  expanding on Husserlian insights  that
begin  from  the  structure  of  motivation  –  to  argue  that  the
26 For a detailed account of the continuity between this such themes in the later work and
Merleau-Ponty’s earlier writings, including not only Phenomenology of Perception but also
The Structure of Behavior, see MULLER 2018.
27 TENGELYI 2004 [1998], 39. For a parallel  discussion and critique of this notion, see the
discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s «new sense argument» in INKPIN 2016, 102-11.
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meaningfulness  of  our  lived  experience,  though  it  may  necessitate
expression, in a certain sense precedes it. The formation of sense can be
traced, at least in part, to a non-conscious, non-thematic, bodily form
of intentionality that can be distinguished from the ego or thematic
consciousness  qua exclusive  constitutional  nexus.  These  aspects  of
lived  experience  exhibit  what  Merleau-Ponty  in  the  quote  at  the
beginning of this section called a «spontaneity that will not tolerate
commands» – a sort of meaning whose givenness is not captured by
more traditional conceptions that see meaning exclusively in terms of
expression  and  constitution  by  the  conscious  subject.  The  gap  or
tension that this spontaneity opens up is the same one that pervades
the portrayal of meaning and the self in Woolf’s novel.
2. Perspectivalism and Meaning in the World
One important way in which the spontaneity of sense is portrayed in
Mrs. Dalloway is via the novel’s perspectival structure. The portrayal of
the inner lives and thoughts of characters moves from the perspective
of one to another by means of shared perceptual objects appearing in a
common lived time and lived space (a motor car, as discussed above;
an airplane; a running child; a woman singing; a passenger bus; an
ambulance).28 This device of Woolf’s experimental prose is well treated
in the literature, and has been discussed above. In this section I wish to
emphasize  the  effect  of  Woolf’s  perspectivalism  in  linking  the
spontaneity of sense formation to the novel’s implicit insistence on the
meaningfulness  of  everyday  occurrences  and  objects  and  to
intersubjectivity  below  the  level  of  expression  in  embodied  lived
experience.  Take  the  following  transition  from  the  thoughts  of
Elizabeth, Clarissa Dalloway’s teenage daughter, who has stolen away
to spend an afternoon on her own in London, to those of Septimus, by
means of their common perceptual experience of the sky and of a city
bus. We begin amidst the thoughts of Elizabeth, looking at the clouds
28 Cf. BAZIN 1993, 115.
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above:
Fixed  though they  seemed  at  their  posts,  at  rest  in  perfect
unanimity,  nothing  could  be  fresher,  freer,  more  sensitive
superficially than the snow-white or gold-kindled surface; to
change,  to  go,  to  dismantle  the  solemn  assemblage  was
immediately  possible;  and  in  spite  of  the  grave  fixity,  the
accumulated robustness and solidity, now they struck light to
the earth, now darkness.
Calmly  and  competently,  Elizabeth  Dalloway  mounted  the
Westminster omnibus.
Going  and  coming,  beckoning,  signaling,  so  the  light  and
shadow  which  now  made  the  wall  grey,  now  the  bananas
bright  yellow,  now  made  the  Strand  grey,  now  made  the
omnibuses bright yellow, seemed to Septimus Warren Smith
lying on the sofa in the sitting-room; watching the watery gold
glow and fade […] Every power poured its treasures on his
head […] At every moment nature signified by some laughing
hint like that gold spot which went round the wall – there,
there, there – her determination to show, by brandishing her
plumes, shaking her tresses, flinging her mantle this way and
that, beautifully, always beautifully, and standing close up to
breathe through her hollowed hands Shakespeare’s words, her
meaning.29 
To whom does the experience of the passing clouds and the omnibus
belong? To Elizabeth, boarding the bus? To Septimus, watching it from
his sitting-room window? There is no neutral, omniscient narrator in
the passage (and very rarely elsewhere in the novel), no overarching
perspective or divine mind to which we could assign the Berkleyian
role  of  fixing  shared  objects  of  perception.  We  are  given  only
perspectives;  we move  directly from one consciousness  to the other.
29 WOOLF 1990 [1925], 139-40.
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But,  as with the examples discussed above, the transition is neither
causal nor rational: the shifting clouds and the bus do not function in
the passage as mere external things. They matter, they are meaningful
to  the  perceivers:  Elizabeth  and Septimus  share  not  only  a  fleeting
glimpse at a yellow bus, but – like the hearers of the backfiring motor
car – parallel  structures of motivation for intentional  consciousness.
Each  experiences  a  simultaneous  fixity  and  fluidity,  indication
relations which lead to a recognition of patterns of color and of light
and dark, and in turn to the perceptual encounter with the clouds and
bus themselves. What the two subjects have in common is thus not
merely  objects  in  space,  but  a  horizon  of  connected sense-relations
whose significance in determining their experience we seem to falsify
if  we label  it  as  a merely coincidentally parallel  constitution in the
minds of two enclosed and independent egos, each of whom owns and
constitutes the experience of the bus separately. Here the meaning is
not simply made in and for each inner life independently;  it is also
simultaneously given, spontaneously, for both. Nature itself «signifies»
and  «shows»  its  meaning,  and  that  meaning  is  not  the  exclusive
possession or creation of a consciousness but out there in the everyday
world.
To be sure, there are separate consciousnesses in play; there is a story
to be told here, along Husserlian lines, about sense constitution in the
separate consciousnesses of Elizabeth and Septimus. But at the same
time,  the  spontaneity  and  givenness  of  sense  works  against  the
exclusively  individualizing  story,  exceeding  the  bounds  of  any
individual ego-consciousness while amounting to more than a shared
perception of brute external objects. For Woolf’s characters, meaning
itself appears as an event in the world. It is neither exclusively their
accomplishment nor merely their possession, and that world is neither
purely external, consisting of meaningless, mind-independent objects
and facts, nor purely internal, made up exclusively of representations
contained in individual consciousnesses. Woolf’s perspectivalism and
use  of  everyday  objects  as  fulcrums  for  transitions  between
perspectives illustrates the way in which meaning arises in the tension
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between  the  core  of  our  innermost  thoughts  (for  Septimus,  for
example,  nature  seems  to  speak  in  Shakespeare’s  words)  and  that
everyday world outside of us which exists «in perfect unanimity» but
is constantly «changing» and «dismantling», infusing experience with
meanings that are not fully our own and that seem to be «poured»
onto our heads from without.30 
3. Meaning, Passivity, and the Unconscious
But this tension also reveals influences that, while outside the purview
of  consciousness,  are  not  outside  ourselves.  This  is  another  way in
which  the  spontaneity  of  sense  is  portrayed  in  the  novel.  It  is  no
accident that the outside element in Septimus’ case, the «gold spot»
that he follows around the room, is an image of the sun that recalls the
words of Shakespeare’s Cymbeline31 – which is appealed to throughout
the  work  and functions  not  only  as  a  point  of  connection  between
Clarissa and Septimus, but also as a sign of Septimus’ triumph over
the meaninglessness of modern life, his preservation of «a thing that
mattered» in his death. Throughout the novel,  sun, sky, and clouds
represent  both a source of meaning outside the purview of  human
power and understanding, and a place of ambiguity suggestive of the
unconscious,  at  once  strange  and  familiar,  in  which  meanings
occasionally rise to the surface that already pervade our lives from
others and our environment in ways we were not previously aware of
and still cannot fully comprehend. 
We see this ambiguity and occasionality of meaning perhaps most
pointedly in the skywriting scene, in which an airplane – one of the
devices Woolf uses to accomplish the narrative shifts  in perspective
discussed above – writes an advertisement in the clouds which seems
to  spell  something  different  for  each  onlooker,  and  in  which  each
30 For a more recent account of this phenomenon in terms of «Meaning Events», see the
editors’ introduction to GONDEK, KLASS, and TENGELYI 2011.
31 SHAKESPEARE, Cymbeline, 4.2.2657-62.
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interpretation  is  informed  by  a  different  popularly  advertised
commercial  brand in  circulation at  the  moment.32 The  airplane,  we
learn,  is  «a symbol […] of  man’s  soul […] to get  outside his  body,
beyond his house»,33 and the letters it spells are in a constant state of
flux that seems to repeat itself and yet precludes a clear fixation on
their meaning: «only for a moment did they lie still; then they moved
and melted and were rubbed out up in the sky, and the aeroplane shot
further away and again, in a fresh space of sky, began writing».34 This
depiction of an almost constant movement, only temporarily lying still
enough to be grasped before disappearing again into a space of the
unknown, is itself suggestive of Woolf’s portrayal of the interplay of
consciousness and the unconscious in the novel.
Woolf’s modernist fascination the meaningfulness of the everyday,
her  perspectivalism  and  her  portrayal  of  embodied  motivational
structures  thus have as a close cousin a notion of  the unconscious.
What is  at stake in such depictions is  a  source of  meaning at  once
beyond  the  active  constitution  of  the  conscious  subject  and  also
thereby not entirely self-transparent, complexly intertwined with our
passivity  and  our  past.  As  Merleau-Ponty  suggests,  when  we
recognize the role played by such «existentials» of meaning left over as
«sediment» from previous experiences, most of which are no longer
available  to  us  as  conscious  memories,  we  can  no  more  treat  the
unconscious as a mere underlayer to conscious thought than we can
ascribe it exclusively to the perspectives of another:
One  always  talks  of  the  problem  of  «the  other»,  of
“intersubjectivity”, etc […] In fact what has to be understood
is, beyond the  “persons”, the existentials according to which
we comprehend them, and which are the sedimented meaning
of  all  our  voluntary  and  involuntary  experiences.  This
32 For  a  brief  interpretation  of  the  skywriting  scene  with  reference  to  the  history  of
technology and advertising, both so important for meaning in modernity, including the
historical significance of specific brands mentioned in the novel, see YOUNG 2000.
33 WOOLF 1990 [1925], 28.
34 WOOLF 1990 [1925], 20.
Metodo Vol. 6, n. 1 (2018)
336                                                                                                   Jacob Rump
unconscious is  to be sought not  at  the bottom of ourselves,
behind the back of our “consciousness”, but in front of us, as
articulations of our field. It is “unconscious” by the fact that it
is  not  an  object,  but  it  is  that  through  which  objects  are
possible,  it  is  the  constellation  wherein  our  future  is  read
[…].35
To say that the unconscious is not behind the back of consciousness
but «in front of us» is to admit that it affects the meaningfulness of our
experience not only in fringe situations or rare cases, but always and
constantly,  functioning  in  the  gaps  between  our  conscious
representations in ways we can never fully predetermine or control. 
As James Phillips has noted, while the notion of «the invisible» is
perhaps the most closely associated with the unconscious in Merleau-
Ponty’s late work, since it is used to convey this sense of «between»
and  of  an  «unexpressed  structure  that  holds  the  visible  world
together», this notion is itself further explained with reference to the
«existentials»  of  the  passage  above.36 For  Merleau-Ponty  these
existentials both «make up the (substitutable) meaning of what we say
and what we understand» and account for the ultimate «ambiguity of
the motivations [that] must be understood by rediscovering our quasi-
perceptual relationship with the human world».37 For Merleau-Ponty,
the Freudian version of the unconscious – especially in the explicitly
linguistic and representational form it took in his contemporary Lacan
– risks overdetermining the relationship between the unconscious and
the  conscious  as  if  expression  were  merely  the  translation  of  pre-
determined thoughts. Merleau-Ponty specifically rejects such a picture
of the relationship of expression and experience: «if we rid our minds
of the idea that our language is the translation or cipher of an original
text, we shall see that the idea of complete expression is nonsensical…
The relation of meaning to the spoken word can no longer be a point
35 MERLEAU-PONTY 1968 [1964], 180.
36 PHILLPS 2017, 88.
37 MERLEAU-PONTY, qtd. in PHILLIPS 2017, 88.
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for point correspondence that we always have clearly in mind».38
It is for this reason characteristic of Merleau-Ponty’s taking up of the
Husserlian focus on sedimentation and genetic phenomenology that
structures of passivity in experience, especially those characteristic of
the  unconscious,  be  understood  not  in  terms  of  a  Sinngebung,  but
rather as a «happening» to and for the subject.  As he writes in his
«Reading notes on Freud»,
Passivity can be understood only on the basis of  event-based
thought.  What is  constitutive of it  is  that  the signification is
here, not by  Sinngebung (neither by the analyst, nor above all
by the patient), but welcoming to an event in a situation and
event  themselves  not  known,  but  grasped  through
commitment,  perceptually,  as  configuration,  proof  of  reality,
relief  on  […]  i.e.,  by  existentialia  and  not  categories.  The
fundamental  fact  is  that  there  are  certain  structures,  in
themselves  not  analyzed,  with  the  help  of  which  we
«understand» all the rest. This is because perception can make
sense  without  its  elements  being  composed in  an adequate
thought […] The fundamental fact is that clarity, sense,  and
truth are in front of us, not within. We can direct ourselves in
an experience according to styles, sure relations, yet without
the organizational signification being possessed.  And this is
ultimately  the  case  because  the  life  of  consciousness  is  not
Sinngebung in  the  constituting  sense,  but  the  fact  that
something happens to someone.39 
For  Merleau-Ponty,  of  course,  as  noted  above,  this  «happening»
ultimately occurs at the level of the lived body. And the «grasping»
that characterizes our engagement with sense at this level is grounded
not in conscious representations and memories or the fixed meaning
of  «categories»,  but,  as  in  the  previous  passage,  in  unanalyzed
38 MERLEAU-PONTY 1964 [1960], 43.
39 Merleau-Ponty, «Reading Notes on Freud», in MERLEAU-PONTY 2010 [2002], 217.
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«existentials», at the level of body memory.40 Merleau-Ponty frames the
unconscious in terms of a non-representational «sedimented practical
schema»  of  the  lived  body,  a  set  of  bodily  habitualities  that,  in
contradistinction to explicit memories and judgments at the level of
conscious awareness, function to record and manifest our individual
lived  histories  even  insofar  as  those  histories  remain  opaque  to
consciousness.41 The phenomenological level here is thus not egoic act-
intentionality  but  the  body-subject  with  its  motivational  nexus  and
operative intentionality,  and the meanings that  arise in accord with
this  operative  intentionality  demonstrate  an  implicit,  prereflective
relationship  to  our  lived  and  embodied  history,42 something
«grasped»,  and  a  pre-condition for  anything  at  all  to  be  «known».
Merleau-Ponty links the notion of the unconscious to the embodied
encounter  with  spontaneous  sense,  even  if  we  always  betray  this
spontaneity  in  bringing sense  to  consciousness  and expression and
thereby fixing it (e.g., in language).43
This  reading  supports  Ricœur’s  claim  that  the  phenomenological
notion of the unconscious – such as we see in Merleau-Ponty44 and
even in some of Husserl’s unpublished later manuscripts – is in fact
more  properly  associated  with  the  psychoanalytic  notion  of  the
preconscious,  since  in  the  case  of  phenomenology  there  is  no  in-
principle barrier (such as repression) which prevents that which is not
conscious  from  rising  to  consciousness  in  the  case  that  it  is,  e.g.,
expressed.45 Similarly,  motivations,  in  the  phenomenological  sense,
while they are passive and in this sense «unconscious», are embodied
motivations that can become known to us – they are not sealed off
40 For a detailed account of the notion of body memory in Merleau-Ponty, see  KOZYREVA
2018.
41 MERLEAU-PONTY 2010 [2002],  191.  For  detailed discussions of the  non-representational
nature of the unconscious in Merleau-Ponty, see KOZYREVA 2018, Phillips 2017.
42 KOZYREVA 2018.
43 See INKPIN 2016, 107-11.
44 For another, more nuanced treatment of the notion of the unconscious in Merleau-Ponty
(beyond my scope here), see LEGRAND 2017.
45 RICŒUR 1977 [1965], 392. For the notion of the preconscious in Freud, see  FREUD 1965
[1900], 579.
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from consciousness except as specially revealed on the analyst’s couch
but rather principles of acting that we may become aware of through
reflection and description, though they function before and outside of
that description. To put the point differently, for phenomenology, the
meaning of that which remains passive or unconscious is not separated
from consciousness, even as, in its spontaneity, it is not limited to it. As
Ricœur  notes,  «phenomenology  shows  that  the  lived  meaning  of  a
behavior extends beyond its representation in conscious awareness»,46
and it is able to do so, I have suggested, by accounting for this lower
level  of  meaning  in  terms  not  of  linguistic  expression  but  of
unconscious (preconscious) embodied sense.
A conception of the unconscious structuring of meaning similar to
the phenomenological account as much or more so than the Freudian
is reflected in Woolf’s prose style. And just as the phenomenology of
Merleau-Ponty  and Husserl  seeks  to  show  «how it  is  possible  that
consciousness  can  bring  to  present  appearance  something
unconscious, that is, something foreign or absent from consciousness,
without thereby incorporating it or subordinating it to the conscious
present»,47 so does Woolf’s prose seek to probe between and beyond
the surfaces of expression – Trotter’s «fabric of meaning worn thin» in
modernity – without assuming or desiring the complete expressibility
of  the  unexpressible.  While  it  is  common  to  characterize  Woolf’s
fiction as a form of stream-of-consciousness writing that lays open for
the reader a character’s inner life, most of Mrs. Dalloway is in fact not
written in the stream-of-consciousness style in the typical sense, but
rather in a form of free indirect discourse.48 The reader is confronted
not  with  the  direct  and exclusive  reporting  of  the  internal  train  of
thought of a single character by that character, but with a description
of that train of thought indirectly, by means of a narrative voice that is
46 RICŒUR 1977 [1965], 397.
47 BERNET 2002.  Bernet’s  treatment  of  these  issues  is  especially  instructive  concerning
Husserlian  transcendental  phenomenology  and  the  temporal  and  representational
aspects  of  the  problematic  of  the  unconsciousness,  topics  unfortunately  somewhat
beyond my scope here.
48 LODGE 2002, 65ff. See also DOWLING 1991, 45ff.
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privy to but imperfectly aligned with the subject’s consciousness. Take
the following passage from the novel, portraying the thoughts of Peter
Walsh, which quite remarkably manifests in its style the very claims it
expresses  in  language:  «For  this  is  the  truth  about  our  soul,  he
thought, our self,  who fish-like inhabits deep seas and plies among
obscurities threading her way between the boles of giant weeds, over
sun-flickered  spaces  and  on  and  on  into  gloom,  cold,  deep,
inscrutable;  suddenly  she  shoots  to  the  surface  and  sports  on  the
wind-wrinkled waves;  that  is,  has  a positive need to brush,  scrape,
kindle  herself,  gossiping».49 This  is  not  direct  self-reporting,  as  we
would expect from stream-of-consciousness writing – a fact that can be
seen from the words  «he thought»  in  the  passage,  which in  direct
stream-of-consciousness  writing  would  either  be  rendered  «I
thought», or not be present at all. Despite the fact that the rest of the
passage  clearly  reveals  the  internal  thoughts  of  the  speaker,  our
perspective on those thoughts is not quite fully or constantly in his
head.50 As for the skywriter passing through the clouds, here too there
is no simple, constant self-presence of consciousness: while the soul at
times «shoots to the surface», at other times it remains «cold, deep,
inscrutable». 
Like  Merleau-Ponty’s  phenomenology,  then,  Woolf’s  free-indirect
style  is  no  more  a  simple  celebration  of  the  transparency  of
consciousness than an insistence on its insurmountable opacity; there
is  an  implicit  recognition  here  of  an  outside,  a  source  of  meaning
partially within consciousness but remaining partially without,  at  a
level of passivity beyond language and not present to consciousness,
but,  as  Merleau-Ponty  puts  it,  «in  front  of»  it  –  in  the  sensations,
affects, emotions and unconscious motivations that drive our lives in
ways  we  not  only  cannot  recognize  and  control,  but  that  remain
49 WOOLF 1990 [1925], 161.
50 A point further emphasized by the contrast between the feminine pronouns used for the
soul masculine pronouns used for speaker. The use of gendered pronouns is another
important aspect of Woolf’s depiction of consciousness in the novel, but is outside my
scope here. 
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partially  mysterious,  unforeseeable,  and  unnamable.51 On  this
phenomenologically  more  robust  view  of  the  relationship  between
experience,  consciousness,  and  meaning,  the  happenings  and
intersubjectivities that imbue our lives with meaning do so not only in
predictable  ways  on  the  surface  level  of  expression  and  conscious
thought, but also, less straightforwardly and less predicably «in front
of  us»,  in the spontaneity of  our non-reflective everyday embodied
interactions  in  the  world.  As  a  final  step  in  our  analysis  of  the
spontaneity of sense,  we need to account for this spontaneity in its
tension  with  the  seeming  predetermination  of  previous  experience
and history.
4. Constitution, Institution, and the Spontaneity of Life
In the classic essay «Modern Fiction», Woolf speaks to this issue in her
critique of what she calls the «materialist» writers prominent in her
day, who «write of unimportant things […] they spend immense skill
and immense industry making the trivial  and the transitory appear
the true and the enduring».52 The materialist writer is «constrained» by
«an air of probability embalming the whole so impeccable that if all
his figures were to come to life they would find themselves dressed
down to the last button of their coats in the fashion of the hour».53 In
the  «materialist»  novels  of  Edwardians  such  as  H.G.  Wells,  John
Galsworthy, and Arnold Bennett, Woolf suggests, a superficial focus
on the description of tangible, physical objects and the public lives of
characters, and a lack of concern for depicting psychological depth or
inner life leads to a style of fiction which is formulaic and without
novelty:  nothing  is  unexpected,  everything happens  exactly  as  it  is
51 In Barbara Hardy’s words, «Woolf uses the free indirect style to register the pressure and
growth of feeling. She tears her characters out of their affective privacy, showing how
passion is checked and qualified, as it gathers momentum and material from external
sensations and events» (qtd. in DOWLING 1991, 47).
52 WOOLF 1925, 152-3.
53 WOOLF 1925, 153-4.
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supposed  to  happen,  perfectly  in  accord  with  the  probabilities
determined by the styles and sentiments of the moment,  and every
detail  and loose  end of  plot  and character  is  neatly  tied up in the
course  of  «two and thirty  chapters  after  a  design which more and
more ceases to resemble the vision in our minds».54 
Despite these novelist’s best efforts to show the contrary, however –
despite the most  careful  attention to detail  –  Woolf  insists  that  the
reality of modern life is neither so perfect nor so predictable. While her
writing  does  not  shy  away from  the  close  description  of  everyday
objects  or  of  characters  as  seen  from  the  standpoint  of  others,  her
emphasis could not be more different. For Woolf, it is precisely that
which arises between and despite what is expected that matters most: 
life  escapes,  and perhaps without life  nothing else  is  worth
while […] for us at this moment the form of fiction most in
vogue  more  often  misses  than  secures  the  thing  we  seek.
Whether  we  call  it  life  or  spirit,  truth  or  reality,  this,  the
essential  thing,  has  moved  off,  or  on,  and  refuses  to  be
contained  any  longer  in  such  ill-fitting  vestments  as  we
provide.55 
Life – real life; that which matters – can no more be buttoned up in the
garb of a fully predictable, expected set of meanings than it can be
captured  within  the  confines  of  an  isolated  and  self-transparent
subject. 
Woolf’s  remark  here  recalls  a  similar  sentiment  in  a  well-known
passage  from  Husserl’s  late  work  The  Crisis,  where  the  fully
mathematized and measured depiction of the world offered to us by
natural  science  is  –  while  perfectly  legitimate  in  its  own  limited
domain – problematic when it is taken as the model for understanding
the full  complexity of our lived experience:  «in the open infinity of
possible experiences, we measure the lifeworld – the world constantly
54 WOOLF 1925, 153.
55 WOOLF 1925, 153.
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given to us as actual in our concrete world-life – for a well-fitting garb
of ideas». Through this  garb, Husserl claims, the mathematician and
the  natural  scientist,  like  Woolf’s  materialist  writer,  «represents the
lifeworld, dresses it up as ‘objectively actual and true’ nature». But such
a picture of our lived experience is too precise, too predictable: it leads
us to «take for true being what is actually a method – a method which is
designed  for  the  purpose  of  progressively  improving,  in  infinitum,
through ‘scientific’ predictions, those rough predictions which are the
only  ones  originally  possible  within  the  sphere  of  what  is  actually
experienced and experienceable in the life-world».56
Husserl’s critiques of scientism along these lines in his later work
were  of  central  importance  for  Merleau-Ponty.  Indeed,  in a  1954-55
lecture  course,  he  seems to  take Husserl’s  claims about  the  merely
rough  predictability  of  the  lifeworld  even  further,  refiguring  the
Husserlian  notion  of  constitution  and  the  associated  conception  of
partially  predetermined meaning «horizons»57 (what  in the passage
above is termed the «open infinity of possible experience») into his
own conception of institution:
[I]nstitution [means] establishment in an experience (or in a
constructed  apparatus)  of  dimensions  (in  the  general,
Cartesian sense: system of references) in relation to which a
whole  series  of  other  experiences  will  make sense  and will
make a  sequel  [suite], a history [/story] [histoire]. The sense is
deposited (it is no longer merely in me as consciousness, it is
not re-created or constituted at the time of recovery). But not
as an object left behind, as a simple remainder or as something
that survives, as a residue. [It is deposited] as something to
continue to complete without it being the case that this sequel
is determined. The instituted will change but this very change
56 HUSSERL 1970 [1936], 51-2. 
57 For  a  recent  account  of  this  Husserlian  notion,  see  YOSHIMI 2016,  53-58  (Yoshimi’s
account, however, is an attempt to formalize the notion of horizons, which would seem
to  be  an  example  of  the  sort  of  pre-determination  account  of  horizons  that  I  am
suggesting Merleau-Ponty rejects).
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is called for by its Stiftung.58 
The  notion  of  institution,  which  Merleau-Ponty  contrasts  with
constitution, is meant to capture the fact that even the sedimentation
of sense does not completely determine or predict the course of events
that  will  follow from it.  Sedimentation functions  rather as  point  of
beginning – of institution – for a «sequel», a new story that is at the
same time  part  of  a  history  (histoire)   –  part  of  a  continuing  story
(histoire). 
Husserl  himself  is  sometimes  read  as  equating  the  notion  of
historical sedimentation more-or-less directly to a process of fixation
of meaning in shared linguistic expression, and there are passages in
his later work that suggest such a reading.59 In the  Phenomenology of
Perception Merleau-Ponty’s  focus  on  the  body  prevents  him  from
making such a straightforward equivocation between sedimentation
and language, and he already implicitly recognizes the insight at the
core of what will become his account of institution. Nonetheless, in
that work, he places more emphasis on the fixity and situatedness of
sedimentation:
We must recognize a sort of sedimentation of our life: when an
attitude toward the world has been confirmed often enough, it
becomes privileged for us. If freedom does not tolerate being
confronted by any motive, then my habitual being in the world
is  equally  fragile  at  each  moment  […]  The  rationalist
alternative – either the free act is  possible or not,  either the
event originates in me or is imposed from outside – does not
fit  with our relations with the world  and with  our past.  Our
freedom does not  destroy our situation,  but  gears  into  it:  so
long as we are alive, our situation is open, which implies both
that it calls forth privileged modes of resolution and that it, by
58 MERLEAU-PONTY 2010 [2002], 8-9, my interpolation/ MERLEAU-PONTY 2002, 38.
59 See,  e.g.,  DERRIDA 1978  [1962].  For  an  alternative  account  that  still  emphasizes  the
intersubjective aspects of sedimentation, see CARR 1974, 103-9.
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itself, lacks the power to procure any of them.60
With  his  later,  explicit  treatment  of  institution,  by  contrast,  the
emphasis  has  shifted  from  fixity  to  spontaneity.  Institution  is  still
intimately tied to the moment of  expression,  the moment in which
instituted horizons of possibility are recognized, though in retrospect.
But whereas, on the earlier taking up of Husserlian sedimentation, we
might have been tempted to ascribe events and happenings to nothing
more  than  the  unfolding  of  possibilities  already  inscribed  through
egoic Sinngebung, Merleau-Ponty’s account of institution can be read as
taking a stronger stance against this misunderstanding of the function
of sedimentation by correcting against a failure to recognize the role of
the unconscious and the involuntary in the arising of  meaning – a
function which for him cannot be attributed straightforwardly to the
problematic  of constitution.61 Though expression and institution are
intimately tied, they cannot be collapsed together: there will  always
remain two levels of meaning at play, that of expressed meaning but
also that  of  prior  embodied sense:  as  for  Woolf,  for  Merleau-Ponty
there is always a sense in which «life escapes» our attempts to express
it. The spontaneity of sense reflects the spontaneity of life.
In her own theoretical reflections in «Modern Fiction» (ideas clearly
put  into  practice  in  the  text  of  Mrs.  Dalloway),  Woolf  similarly
advocates  for  the  vagaries  and  inconsistencies  of  our  actual  lived
60 MERLEAU-PONTY 2013, 466-7. For a defense of this view in contrast to a Heideggerian-
inspired Ereignis-view of meaning in history, see RUMP 2014.
61 See Claude Lefort’s Introduction to the lecture course (MERLEAU-PONTY 2010 [2002], x),
for  discussion  of  this  point  with  regard to  the  «Kantian  sense»  of  constitution.  The
relationship  between  institution  and  constitution  in  the  Husserlian  sense  is  more
complicated,  though in the lecture  course Merleau-Ponty does  seem to  be  making a
contrast  with  Husserl  despite  the  latter’s  careful  qualifications  of  the  term:  «In  the
concept  of  institution  we  are  seeking  a  solution  to  the  difficulties  found  in  the
philosophy of consciousness. Over and against consciousness, there are only the objects
constituted  by consciousness.  Even if  we grant  that  certain  of  the  objects  are  ‘never
completely’ constituted (Husserl), they are at each moment the exact reflection of the
acts and powers of consciousness. There is nothing in these constituted objects that is
able to throw consciousness back into other perspectives». (MERLEAU-PONTY 2010 [2002],
76). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me on this point.
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experience, at turns unexpected, boring, pleasant, wandering or fixed
(though never fully) in expression. In perhaps the most well-known
passage  of  the  essay,  after  the  critique  of  «materialist  writers»
discussed  above,  Woolf  provides  an  account  of  the  sort  of  deeper
reflections she seeks, never entirely successfully, to capture: 
Examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day.
The mind receives a myriad impressions –  trivial, fantastic,
evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel. From all
sides they come, an incessant shower of innumerable atoms;
and  as  they  fall,  as  they  shape  themselves into  the  life  of  a
Monday or a Tuesday, the accent falls differently from of old
[…] Life is not a series of gig lamps symmetrically arranged,
but a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding
us from the beginning of consciousness to the end.62
Faced with the «evanescence» and semi-opacity of the spontaneity of
sense,  of  meanings  «shaping  themselves»  in  ways  never  fully
predictable, never fully in our conscious grasp or control, we strive to
make sense of life in general and of our own lives by expressing the
meanings we find already, if imprecisely and unpredictably, in it. 
62 WOOLF 1925, 154, my emphasis.
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5. Makings of the Modern Self: Meaning, Identity, and
Life-history
Having given an account of the complex and multi-layered portrayal
of meaning in Woolf’s novel, with emphasis on the ways in which the
spontaneity of sense exceeds expression, and having shown how this
spontaneity of sense arises from the spontaneity of life,  we need to
turn now to the other distinctly modern notion – complex and multi-
layered in its own right – that informs Woolf’s portrayal of «things that
matter»  in  that  final  party  scene  of  the  novel:  the  problematic  of
identity and self. 
Philosophers influenced by and working in the phenomenological
tradition  have  approached  active forms  sense-making  in  terms  of
narrative – an idea already suggested in Merleau-Ponty’s play on the
double meaning of histoire in the passage cited above.63 This conception
of narrative applies not only to works of literature such as Woolf’s, but
to the  structuring of  our  lives  and our  conceptions of  selfhood.  As
David Carr notes, «human beings live their lives by formulating and
acting  out  stories  that  they  implicitly  tell  both  to  themselves  and
others. Indeed, in this realm time itself is human, narratively shaped
by beings who live their lives not from moment to moment, but by
remembering what was and projecting what will be».64 But it should
be clear from our discussion above that such active, voluntary sense-
making,  on  the  model  of  linguistic  expression,  can  never  fully
assimilate the lived and embodied spontaneous formation of sense to
which it responds. 
If spontaneous sense cannot be reduced to expressed meaning, but
remains  in  constant  productive  tension  with  it,  it  follows  that  we
cannot be merely who we take ourselves to be according to the stories
we tell, any more than we can fully predict or understand the histories
63 See, e.g., RICŒUR 1990 [1983-5]; CARR 1986, 2014. Outside the phenomenological tradition,
a similar and highly influential account of the self in terms of narrative is developed in
MACINTYRE 1981.
64 CARR 2014, 208. For a critical review of this work focusing on topics similar to those
discussed here, see RUMP 2016.
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in  the  midst  of  which  we  find  ourselves.  While  the  narrative
conception of the self is certainly correct concerning the active, self-
reflective sense-making of our lives, this element cannot exist without
another that simultaneously constrains and contradicts it. As Tengelyi
has argued, when we bring together narrative accounts of the self with
the  notion  of  spontaneous  sense  formation,  we  confront  an
unavoidable tension:
We  attempt  to  articulate  –  and  thereby  to  fix –  this  sense
retrospectively or, better still, retroactively by telling rectified –
reshaped, modified or entirely renewed – stories. Thus, we try
to get hold of what is beyond our scope and control. Owing to
this  endeavor,  we  succeed  in  most  cases  in  preserving  the
identity of ourselves, or at least we manage to recuperate it
after the interlude of a crisis. But nothing warrants the success
of our continual efforts to fix retroactively the spontaneously
emerged senses in our lives. On the contrary, experience shows
that the process of sense formation repeatedly escapes from
our grasp, challenging over and over again even our rectified
stories  and breaking up,  from time to time,  the supposedly
hard core of our identity.65
In the case of narrative, we are limited to the vocabularies of ourselves
and those around us: our retroactive sense fixation can only rely on
fixed meanings (Bedeutungen). But these fixed meanings – predictable
categories that «button up» life – never finally or fully contain that life.
As Tengelyi notes, it follows from this that life-history and self-identity
may be intimately connected and even inseparable concepts, but they
nonetheless resist equivalency or interchangeability.66 Life-history, as a
history  of  instituted  (not  merely  constituted)  meanings,  remains  in
tension with self-identity. And thus the tension at the heart of the self
mirrors the tension at the heart of meaning, the «alterity of experience
65 TENGELYI 2004 [1998], xxvii
66 TENGELYI 2004 [1998], xxvii.
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and  expression».67 The  problematization  of  the  phenomenological
meaning-making subject discussed in the sections above is at the same
time a problematization of the self as a stable source of identity. 
This  persistent  cleft  between  self-identity  and  the  broader  life
histories in which we find ourselves is a virtual constant in Woolf’s
novel, which, although its activity takes place in the course of a single
day,  consists  largely  in  recollections  in  the  minds  of  its  characters,
especially recollections of their youth. Indeed, the entire novel can be
read as an attempt by the central characters to come to terms with the
people whom – in comparison with the self-conceptions of their youth
and behind the back of consciousness, as it were – they have become.
This is  the case especially for Clarissa,  not  only in the novel’s  final
scene, when she returns from the room alone to confront again the life
history in  which she belongs,  with Sally  and Peter,  but  also  in  the
various  moments  in  the  novel  portraying,  in  Hussey’s  words,  «a
momentary resolution of scattered attributes that saves Clarissa from a
moment of despair», a «constitution of identity» that «holds in tension
a circumference of memories that pertain to that center».68
At the forefront of the tensions between Clarissa’s self-identity and
her life history is her marriage to Richard Dalloway – a tension alluded
to in the title of the novel itself. She reassures herself at several points
in the novel  that the right choice has been made – even if  it is not
exactly clear why or how it was made – in marrying Richard Dalloway,
a  rather  dull  if  thoroughly  dependable  man,  rather  than the  more
adventurous  and  seemingly  more  like-minded  Peter.  And  yet  as
67 We can even say, in line with my account above, that both arise not only in expression
but first and foremost at the level of the lived body itself – my own body, my experience
of  others as encountering similar  embodied motivations,  and their  experience of  my
body. As Joona Taipale notes with regard to Husserl (a point we can extend to Merleau-
Ponty as well): «In Husserl’s phenomenology, selfhood and the lived-body are not simply
and unambiguously synonymous. On the one hand, the self has a perceivable exteriority
in the sense that it  is  expressed in externally  perceivable  movements,  but  the self  is
neither exhausted by nor reducible to this exteriority. On the other hand, the self is what
makes up the ‘lividness’ or subjectivity of the lived body. It is this interiority, and hence
something that  is  expressed  in  the externally  perceivable  movements» (TAIPALE 2014,
223).
68 HUSSEY 1986, 26.
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Richard’s wife she is, as she notes at the outset of the novel, «not even
Clarissa any more» but rather «this being Mrs. Richard Dalloway», a
high-society woman no different from the others as she walks along
Bond street to buy flowers for her party, «invisible, unseen; unknown;
there being no more marrying, no more having of children now, but
only  this  astonishing  and  rather  solemn  progress  with  the  rest  of
them».69 Toward the end of the novel, the crisis of Clarissa’s identity
comes to a head as she welcomes guests to her party, playing the role
of hostess and wife. She admits to «this feeling of being something not
herself, and that every one was unreal in one way; much more real in
another. It was, she thought, partly their clothes, partly being taken
out  of  their  ordinary  ways,  partly  the  background».70 With  this
admission she has, it seems, finally lost the thread of her own identity
among the personalities,  roles  and histories  that  have provided the
«background»  meanings  that  structure  and  define  her  life  from
without and that now seem to crowd it out in the midst of her party.
And yet, at the very end of the novel, directly after her experience of
shock  at  the  news  of  the  death  of  Septimus,  and  her  feeling  and
thinking  that  «somehow  it  was  her  disaster  –  her  disgrace»,  we
witness an assessment of self-identity in contrast to her assigned place
in an external life-history: 
It  was  due to Richard;  she  had  never  been  so  happy.  Nothing
could  be  slow  enough;  nothing  last  too  long.  No  pleasure
could equal […] this having done with the triumphs of youth,
lost herself in the process of living, to find it, with a shock of
delight, as the sun rose, as the day sank. Many a time had she
gone, at Bourton when they were all talking, to look at the sky;
or  seen  it  between  people’s  shoulders  at  dinner;  seen  it  in
London when she could not sleep.71
When we recall the aforementioned importance of the sky as an image
69 WOOLF 1990 [1925], 11.
70 WOOLF 1990 [1925], 170-1. Cf. HUSSEY 1986, 27.
71 WOOLF 1990 [1925], 185, my emphasis.
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of  ambivalent  meaning  in  the  novel  –  location  of  the  ambiguous
message of the airplane skywriter; stand-in for the unconscious; place
of the sun whose heat we learn, with Septimus’ death, to fear no more
– and when we read, in the subsequent paragraph, that the very sky so
familiar in Clarissa’s life is also, once she is confronted with the image
of a much older woman at her window in the apartment opposite,
«something  new  to  her»,  we  encounter,  finally,  Clarissa’s  joyful
acceptance  of  the  juxtaposition  between  personal  identity  and  life
history illustrated in the  dichotomous  feelings  and thoughts  of  her
inner life. In the context of the novel as a whole, this is none other than
a  recognition  and  embrace  of  the  juxtaposition  between  the
spontaneity of sense – embodied, unconscious, out there in the world –
with expression.
6. Conclusion 
Despite,  and,  indeed,  in  a  certain  way,  because  of this  modernist
dissolution of the self as source and locus of the meaning of one’s life,
the phenomenological ideas discussed here can help us to explicate
that peculiar optimism that arises seemingly spontaneously at the end
of Mrs. Dalloway. At the party, upon hearing of Septimus’ death, when
Clarissa  retreats  to  the  «little  room»  of  her  own  consciousness,
thinking  «[p]erhaps  there  was  somebody  there.  But  there  was
nobody»,72 she encounters, in spite of but indeed also because of that
void, a thing that matters, outside of herself, but part of the making of
her  self,  in  the  commonalities  and  mysteries  of  modern  life.  She
throws away the stifling if comfortable notion of the self arising from a
too  simple  conception  of  meaning  for  one  assembled  from  the
ordinary commonalities and spontaneous senses of life:
She felt  somehow very like him – the young man who had
killed  himself.  She felt  glad that  he  had done it;  thrown it
72 WOOLF 1990 [1925], 183.
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away. The clock was striking. The leaden circles dissolved in
the air. He made her feel the beauty; made her feel the fun. She
must assemble. She must find Sally and Peter. And she came in
from the little room.73
Woolf’s novel exhibits a distinctly phenomenological recognition of the
complexity of meaning, of its unpredictability and partial absence, and
of the way that it is – at least sometimes – something that confronts us
as  an outside  not  simply belonging to  or  constituted by us.  I  have
argued  that  this  ambiguous,  partially  present  character  can  be
understood in light of a spontaneity of sense that gives our lives both
mystery and meaning, complicating without negating our conception
of ourselves. Despite their radically different modes of presentation,
both modernists such as Woolf and phenomenologists such as Husserl
and Merleau-Ponty sought to interrogate the fundamental importance
of  this  phenomenon of  meaning.  They  recognized  as  an important
challenge  of  modern  life  the  need  to  uncover  the  complexities  of
human experience that make it meaningful – a thing that matters –
without  failing  to  account  for  the  ways  in  which  we  always  fall
somewhere  short  in  our  explanations  and  expressions  and  find
ourselves  –  lose  ourselves  –  amidst  the  familiar  novelty  of  the
everyday.  A  weekday in  June,  for  instance;  a  day  as  ordinary  and
mysteriously meaningful as any other.
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